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STNfEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a second degree
f ,, lony,

t hcd t, in the Sec0nd ,Judie ia l District Court of Morgan

County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of a second degree felony, theft,
in a jury trial held before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, on
November 16, 1982.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of not less

than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah State
Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on the grounds
as set forth in the following argument.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1 n the early n1orning hours of October 1,

1982, Officer

Vincent K. Nelson ot the Morgan County Sheriffs Department
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November 16, 1982.
The appellant contended at trial that he had no part in the
theft but was merely pickec up while hitch-hiking and pi1ssed out
in the truck which was actually stolen by the States' witness,
John Pentz.

Mr. Pentz admitted to driving the truck into Morgan,

his place of residence, but alleged that he had been picked up by
defendant in Salt Lake City and that defendant drove until he
passed out on the interstate highway.

(T. 43)

When the Morgan

police arrive at the truck the defendant is passed out in the
passenger seat leaning towards the middle of the truck.

(T.

71)

The sole testimony presented by the defense was that of Mr.
Velarde.

During the cross-examination of Mr. Velarde, the

prosecutor, over the repeilted objections of defense counsel,
questioneC the app0l Lt1ol extensively on his clec1sion to remain
silent after arrest, and his failure to proclaim his innocence.
The court did not attempt to admonish the State's attorney or
instruct the jury to disregard the questions and arguments as
improper.
These questions and arguments were received into evidence
Tt1t

('1,11_;-t

n0vcr

Llllf!l llfJ\

JI

d]J{i

11:Jt !11 J.'I

I./,•'

rkHH

t()

1_:uuntcract the prc·judicia.l

Pftect such an impl1ratinn had on the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCE, DURING BOTH CROSSEXl\MINATION AND ARGUMENT TO THE JURY, REGARDING
APPELLANT'S POST ARREST SILENCE, VIOLATED
APPELLlltJT' S FIFTH l\.MENDMENT RIGHT TO SILENCE
AND IS A PREJUDICIAL AND THEREFORE REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
The absolute right against self-incrimination granted
criminal defendants by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, has been solidly defined and augmented in
numerous decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In Miranda v.

Arizona, 348 US 436, 16 LED 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602,

(1966), the

court held that any confession obtained during custodial
interrogation of criminal defendants can be entered into evidence
only if such confession was procured after meaningfully advising
the defendant of his constitutional right to silence, followed by
a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights.
The court went on to address the issue of prosecutorial
comment on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence and
attempts to infer guilt from such exercise.

In footnote 37, the

court said,
"In accord with our decision today, it is
impermissible to penalize an individual for
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under pulicr
interrogation.
Tht' 1>ro:-;c.c·l1t iri11 may not, lllerelore, use at
tn.il L11e tJC'l tl1,-it 11, cl()od mute or claimed
pi-1\'llf'(_.1r
in the t,i.r'{ of ac-cusat1on."
0

Id <1 l
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In the case of United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 71, 4':J J. J:d
2d 99, 95 S Ct 2133

(1975), the court addressed more spPcifir,d!y

the issue presently before this court.

By affirming the

of a defendant's conviction on the grounds that his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor on
cross-examination asked defendant why he had not given the police
his alibi defense when questioned, the court left no doubt that
such prosecutorial conduct would render a defendant's Fifth
Amendment protections a helpless facade.

It is important to note

that the reversal was affirmed, notwithstanding the courts
instructions to the jury to disregard the improper questioning.
The court thus held "We find that the probative value of
respondents pre-trial silence in this case was outweighed by the
prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence." Id at 73.
In these two decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear
that reference to a defendant's proper exercise of his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the prosecutor
was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
However, the question remained unanswered of whether a prosecutor
could comment for impeachment purposes on a defendant's failure
to explain his innocence after waiving or partially waiving his
Fifth Amendment right to silence.

This point was resolved by the

court in the case of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L ED 2d 91,
96 S Ct. 2240

(1976).

In this case, defendant and a co-defendant

were arrested and charged with selling marijuana to a police
informant.

The defendant was given a miranda warninq whilP
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"We hold
lencc, at

the trn11c of arr<cst ,,nd dfter receiving miranda warnings, violated
the due process clause> of the Fourteenth 1,mendment." Id at 619.
The Utdh Suprenre ,-iclhrcres t<:; the standard set forth in Doyle
and in the case of State v. l'ilswell, 639 P2d 146

(Utah, 1981),

has fortified the protection of a defendant's constitutional
rights.

In the Wiswell case, the prosecutor repeatedly attempted

to introduce into evidence the defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right to remain silent.

Defense counsel's

obJection were sustained on all three cross-examination questions
as well as on the prosecutors closing argument to the jury.
Although the trial courts attempted to rectify the improper
references by striking the questions and admonishing the jury to
disregard them,
so deciding,

the appellate court reversed the conviction.

the court held that

"The continued attempts by the prosecutor to
put the defendant's silence before the jury
after his hav111g been advised of his right to
remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
The
tc dcfenc1nnt 1 s silence arc
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trial showed that at the time of arrest, Mr. Vclard('
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extremely intoxicated (T. 66), and his answers to questions posPd
by the officer were short and confused, leaving doubt

dH
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whether defendant knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment riqhts.
The transcript of the trial shows that the prosecutor referred to
Mr. Velarde's exercise of his Fifth amendment right no less than
eight times, including the following exchanges:
"Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why didn't you

Question:

tell Officer Nelson your side of the story?"
Question:

(T.

92)

"And it is your position Mr. Velarde ... that you

chose not to tell Mr. Nelson anything because you can't trust
police officers?"
Question:

(T.

94)

"So you have elected to go forward with this

entire criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft and
wait until today for the first time to give your version of what
happened?"

(T.

Question:

94)

"Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that ynu

have elected to state your version of what occurred
County and in Morgan County, is that true?"
T.

(T.

96)

i11

Salt Lake
(See also

92-96).

The prosecutor further commented on the appellants exercise
of his Fifth Amendment right to silence throughout his argument
to the jury.

This argument included th(' fol lnw1nn

L1ten1e11t,;
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say,
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I'm innocent?

SlX

Mr. Pent; l1cHl that truck not me.
You have got
the wt·onq n"rn.
I don't 0ven know how to drive
a four-spe•·d. What's wronq with the outrage?
My heavens, tl1c·re, according to Mr. Velarde,
the guilty man is walking away ... Where is the
outrage? Where i s the indignation? Where is
the sense of being victimized?"
(T. 104-105)
(Sec also T. 103-105 ancl 109-111.)
Furthermore, although defense c0unsel repeatedly and
vehemently obJected to these v1olat1ons of the defendant's
constitutional rights, the court allowed the questions to stand
and made no effort to minimize their preJudic1al effect through
either jury admonition or jury instruction.

This left defense

counsel with the impossible task of attempting to nullify the
prejudice through his closing argument.

As the decision in State

v. Wiswell, made clear, such conduct on the part of a prosecuting
attorney renders the defendant void of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment protections even where the court attempts to mitigate
How much worse then is such misconduct when the

the damage.

court allows a prosecutor to proceed with impunity as in the
present case?

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Miranda,

Hale and Doyle v. Ohio, and the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
State v. Wiswell, all hold that references to the defendant's
post arrest silence during questioning or argument to the jury,
prejGdicial as to require a
'iJTl\. l

Ti"" pre• Jud1c1al
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obvious.

In the present case, the county attorney used the

defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights to discrf'dit
appellants testimony, and, in fact, based his entire cloc;inq
argument on that same constitutionally protected silence.

The

case of Doyle v. Ohio, is controlling in the case before this
court and holds that the appellants Fourteenth Amendment rights
to due process of the law were violated by the prosecutors
improper use of appellants post arrest silence to impeach his
testimony.

Additionally, the case of State v. Wiswell rules

specifically that prosecutors use of the appellants silence
during the closing arguments to the jury was prejudicial error.
The appellant therefore prays that this court reverse the
lower courts decision and remand the case back to the Second
Judicial District Court of Morgan County for proper disposition
consistent with the appellants Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _L__ day of June, 1983.
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing brief to the Attorney General, 236
State Capitol Building, Sdlt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage
prepaid, this

i"
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day of June, 1983.
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